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THE ISOLATION PARADOX AND THE DISCOUNT RATE
FOR BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS

Peter G. Warr and Brian D. Wright

I.

INTRODUCTION
A

dominant issue in the literature on benefit-cost analysis has

been the appropriateness or otherwise of using market rates of discount
for the intertemporal aggregation of benefits and costs.

One important

argument for using a non-market rate of discount is based on the insight
that under certain assumptions individuals would voluntarily enter into
a social contract committing them to increase their total savings, for
the benefit of future generations, above the level they chose privately.
This divergence of collective and individual behavior, which is a mani
festation of the famous "prisoner's dilemma"_ problem of game theory, was
postulated by Baumol [1952] and Eckstein [1958] an~ was called the "isola
tion paradox" by Sen [1961] in a study of optimal saving.
In two celebrated papers Marglin [1963a, 1963b] argued that in
an economy containing both private saving for benevolent purposes and
public investment the existence of an isolation paradox can justify the
use of a discount rate for benefit-cost analysis which is below the private
rate of return on savings.

This argument is now widely recognized in

.the literature on benefit-cost methodology1 , with major criticisms concentrating on the empirical validity of the assumptions about individual
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preferences postulated in the formal development of the model in Sen [1967). 2
Since the parameters concerned are difficult to measure, the likelihood
that the isolation paradox will indeed exist has become largely a matter
of individual judgement.

On the other hand, there has been essentially

no challenge to the conclusion that if an isolation paradox of the Narglin
Sen type does exist the appropriate rate of discount for use in benefit
cost analysis lies below the market rate of discount.
The present paper takes issue with this conclusion.

Taking the

isolation paradox argument on its own terms, it aims to show that the
appropriate rate of discount for use in benefit-cost analysis is the
market rate of discount, whether the isolation paradox actually holds or
not.

This is done by constructing a simple general equilibrium model re

flecting the inter-generational benevolence lying at the heart of the
isolation paradox analysis.
market distortions.

Like Marglin and Sen, we ignore other capital

This model is presented in Section II.

In Section

III it is then shown that the appropriate rate of discount for use in
benefit-cost analysis in this model is the market rate of discount, re·gardless of whether the Marglin-Sen assumptions on individual preferences
and distributional mechanisms, implying the existence of an isolation
paradox, are imposed on the model.

The alternative approach advocated

hy ~arglin [1936h] and Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen [1972] imposes far more
formidable data requirements and c,.mld at best produce results which are
equivalent to the calculation of net present value using the market rate
of discount: but in Section IV we argue that in general no such equivalence
is possible.
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II.

PRIVATE SAVINGS AND THE ISOLATION PARADOX

Structure of the Model
We begin with a simple general equilibriu m model which captures
the essence of the problem.

The well known problems of generaliz ing

from two period savings models 3 require us to begin with three periods
(generati ons), denoted 0, 1 and 2.

Since the focus of the paper is on

inter-gen erational rather than intragene rational savinr,s, we imagine the
life of each generatio n to be focused on a single discrete point in time
and, for simplicit y, the interval between generatio ns will correspon d to
. a fixed period of time.

In;ra-gen erational savings are thereby ignored,

The existence of an isolation paradox in any generatio n requires that
that generatio n contain a minimum of two individua ls.

So the first two

generatio ns, 0 and 1, each contain two individua ls, denoted 1 and 2 and
3 and 4, respectiv ely.

But since the isolation paradox cannot arise for

the final generatio n (there is no subsequen t generatio n for whom to save),
it will contain only one individua l, denoted 5.
Each individua l receives an income in lump sum form.
in principle make donations of two types:
(ii) to members of the next generatio n.

He can then

(i) to his contempor ary, or
The individua l

in the final

period is an exception since, for vim, donations of hoth types are infeasibl e.
Type (ii) donations earn a rate of return o and the proceeds are divided
among the members of the succeedin g generatio n.

We assume that this rate of retur

Pis unaffecte d by any of the marginal savings decisions or public investment projects occurring within the model and for simplicit y we will suppose
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It is convenient to think of p of as the

it to be constant over time.

The way type (ii)

rate of return available on an external capital market.

donations are divided among members of the next generation is, for now,
left open.

It may be determined by the donor himself (say, through a will),

by some other, more rigid rule of distribution beyond his control, or by
some combination of the two, but the donor is nevertheless aware of the
way his donations are to be distributed.

In keeping with the Marglin-Sen

assumptions, it will presently be assumed that individual preferences are
such that type (i) donations never occur while (except for period 2) all
individuals make positive type (ii) donations.
The utility of each individual depends on his own consumption, that
of his contemporary and that of the members of the succeeding generation.
The individual in the final generation is again the obvious exception.

1
So for individual 1, for example, U
the consumption of individual i.

=

i
4
3
2
1 1
U (c, c, c , c ), where c denotes

The utility of the individual in period 2

depends simply on his own consumption.

The utility function of each in

dividual is strictly concave, twice differentiable and strictly increasing
in all arguments with the possible exception of the consumption of his
contemporary, in which it is non-decreasing.

Hence, there is no malevolence.

The consumption of individual 1 is given hy c

1

1

= Y

- hl + h

2

1
- s ,

1
1
where Y is his lump sum incom~h is his voluntary donation to his con-

temporary,
s

1

individual 2, h

2

is his contemporary's donation to him, and

= s 13 + s 14 is his total voluntary saving for the benefit of the next

·
s
generation,

13

an d s

14 b i
e ng t h ose port i ons o f i t earmar k e d f or i n d.1v1. d ua 1 s

3 and 4, respectively.

The consumption of individual 3 is c

3

3

= Y

- h

3

+ h 4 - s 3 + ( 1 + p ) ( s 13 + s 23) , where al 1 terms are d e f ine d ana 1 ogous 1 y
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as above.

The final term indicates the savings contributions of individuals

1 and 2 to individual 3 (s
rate of return p.

13

and s

23

, respectively) which then earn the

For individual 5, c

5

= Y5 + (1 + p) (s 3 + s 4 ).

The

expressions for the consumption of individuals 2 and 4 are directly anal
ogous with those above for 1 and 3, respectively.
Private Savings
Consider now the private utility maximization problem of individual
1, taking the behavio~ of all others individuals (in particular, his con
temporary) as given.
hl (Ul

The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are

Ul) = O; Ul
2
1

1

ul
2

(1)

> 0

=

and
s

1 (Ul
1

-

(1

+

P) Ul) =

s

O; Ul

1

-

(1

+

P) Ul >

s

=

(2)

(),

u;

u;

1
13
13
where U~ - au /acj and
is a shorthand notation for (A
+ (1 - A ) U~).
13
.
Obviously, A denotes the marginal proportion of individual l's savings
earmarked for individual 3, which may he either a choice variable or a
parameter for individual 1.
In parallel with the Marglin-Sen assumptions, we assume that individual
preferences are such that these conditions are satisfied by h
s

1

>

o,

implying that u

1
1

>

1

= 0 and

u12

and
(3)

The story for individuals 2, 3 and 4 is identical.

No one contributes

voluntarily to his contemporary, but each saves voluntarily for the benefit
of his successors.

These future benefits are discounted by each individual

-f,-

at the rate p, which is called alternatively the private rate of discount
(return) or market rate of discount (return).
The Isolation Paradox
Imagine individuals 1 and 2 to have separately chosen their optimal
levels of savings, behaving atomistically as above.

We now consider a

contract between them which collllllits each to raise his total level of
savings by one unit.

These additional savings earn the rate of return p

as before and the proceeds are distributed to individuals 3 and 4 in the
·
3
3
proportions y and 1 - y , respectively.

The effect on individual l's

welfare is given by

(4)

Similarly,
(5)

The debate in the literature has centered on whether or not it is
reasonable to expect both the private optimal savings conditions derived
above and du 1 > 0 and dU

2

> O in (4) and

(5) to hold.

If they do, the

isolation paradox hold?• meaning that the initial equilibrium under private
savings was not Pareto optimal in what Marglin calls the "bourgeois democratic"
sense

namely that the welfare of only the current generation (generation

O) is considered.

4

Since strategic behavior is ruled out, adoption of the

above contract would be supported by a consensus of generation O.
In a masterly paper, Sen (1967) sets out several sets of sufficient
but not necessary conditions for this to be so.

By substituting the

optimal private savings condition (3) into (4), we see that au

1

>

0 is

equivalent to

u11 - u12

>

2(1 + p)

(6)
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.
13
3
=y
Among Sen's sufficient conditions are the obvious ones of A

u!, either of which guarantees

(6) since, also by assumption,

(Analogous conditions ensure that dU

2

>

O.)

5

Neither of

these special cases is as far-fetched, as it first
appears.
A

s

13

14

13
This is best seen by reconsidering the meaning of A •

is a choice variable for individual 1, then provided both s
13
O, he chooses A
such that

>

u13

=

u41 •

So the magnitude of

13

y3

If

and
makes no

difference to him for marginal collective decisions and~) holds imrnediately.

13
On the other hand, if A
is a rigidly specified rule of distri-

bution, outside the control of individual 1, it is possible that

u; f uz.

But if the same rigid rule applies t.o the distribution of collective
13
3
savings as to private savings, as seems possible at least, A
= y
and again (6) follows.
As several subsequent authors have pointed out, relation (6), knd

the corresponding relations for individuals 2, 3 and 4, may or may not
in fact hold, and this matter is not easily resolved empirically.

We do not propose to join the debate on this issue since it

is our aim in the next section to ·show that whether these inequalities
(or the opposite ones) hold or not makes no difference for the choice of
the appropriate rate of discount for benefit-cost analysis.

But for the

moment, suppose that these inequalities do hold, as in (6;.

Consider a

.
.
collective contract o f the above type earning
a rate o f return
r 1 , rather

than p, such that dUl = 0.

Solving for r

1

we obtain

(7)

which, with either

y3

13
= A
or

u13

=

u41

becomes, utilizing (3),
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This is what Marglin and Seri each call the "social" rate of discount.
This discount rate is not reflected in individual market behavior, as
distinct from P, which is called the "private" rate of discount.

Given

1
1
1
the Marglin-Sen assumption that u > u , from (6) and (8) we have r
1

< p

2

and likewise, performing this exercize for individuals 2, 3 and 4, we
have ri < p, i

= 1, ... ,

There is a value of r

i

4; but there is nothing to ensure ri

=

rj, i / j.

for each individual in each generation and strong

additional assumptions are needed to guarantee that they are the same.
It seems somewhat odd to call such an individual discount rate the "social"
rate when it is, in a very real sense, more "private" than p, the market
rate.

Nevertheless, r

i

applies to collective savings d_ecisions, while
Furthermore, however the aggregation prob-

P applies to individual ones.

"the;' social rate of discount, r,
lem of moving from the set ~. ri 'to
i
is resolved, it seems clear that since ri

< p

for all i, r

< .P

as well.

Acting collectively, it seems, the members of society are prepared to
undertake investments that, acting individually, they are not. 6
To see the significance of ri~ imagine the introduction of a small
public project which, to keep the example simple, affects the eonsumption of the two individuals in each generation equally.
de

2

= dC /2, de

3

0

= de

4

= dC

1

So de

1

=

/2, and de 5 = dc 2 , where dCt denotes

the cha~ge in total consumption in generation t.

Consider its effects

on the utility of individual 1.

dU

1

4
=

r

i=l

du

·l

Ul

1

u 1 dci = (Ul
i
1

rl)
= (1 +
dC
(1

+

p)

dC /2 + (Ul + Ul) dC/2 ,
+ ul)
4
3
0
2

1

0

+ (1 + p) dC 1 •

(9)

(10)
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Suppose we have somehow determined the changes in final consumption in
each period induced hy the project.

To determine whether indivjdual lhas

been made better off or worse off, it seems from (10) that the weight
to be applied to the change in consumption in period 1 relative to that
1
:i.n period O is 1/(1 + r ).

The appropriate rate of discount, from in-

1

dividual l's point of view, is r .
and Sen (1972] that r

]

=

r

2

= r.

7

Suppose, following Dasgupta, Marglin
Then it seems that if we grant the exis-

tence of the isolation paradox, implying r

< p,

there is good reason for

thinking that the appropriate discount rate for benefit-cost analysis
is the "soc,ial'' rate of discount, r, a conclusion that has been widely
accepted in the literature.
is erroneous.

But we shall now sr·ow that this argument
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III.

GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM EFFECTS OF A PROJECT

Supp ose now that a "sma ll" publ ic (or priv ate)
inves tmen t proj ect is
adop ted and can be desc ribed by a vect or of
net retur ns to the five indi vidu als, sprea d out over the three perio ds. 8
If all these net retur ns
were posi tive (neg ative ) the proj ect woul d
be unam biguo usly desi rable
(und ersir able ) and bene fit-c ost anal ysis woul
d be unne cessa ry. To keep
the prob lem non- trivi al we supp ose that at
leas t one of these net retur ns
is nega tive and at leas t one is posi tive.
Let the net retur ns in perio d 0
from proj ect x sum to BX , divid ed among indiv
idua ls 1 and 2 in the pro0
port ions a x and 1 - a X , resp ectiv ely. Simi
larly , in perio d 1 these net
0
0
retu rns sum to BX , divid ed betw een indiv idua
ls 3 and 4 in the prop ortio ns
1
X
a and 1 - a X and in perio d · 2 the net retur
n is BX , Ther e are no sign
1
1
2
rest ricti ons on the tota l retur ns to any one
gene ratio n or on the prop ortions in whic h they are divid ed.
the typi cal case ) but

a:

For exam ple, Bx may be nega tive (prob ably
0

also nega tive, so that indiv idua l l's net retur
n

is posi tive whil e indiv idua l 2's is nega tive.

We now wish to cons ider the

adju stme nts that follo w this .
We wish to deriv e the chan ge in the fina l consu
mptio n of each indi vidu al resu lting from the adop tion of the proj
ect. For the five indiv idua ls
this give s:
dc 1 = - ds 1 + a~ B~,

de

2

= - ds

2

(ll)
X

X

+ (1 - a 0 ) B0 ,

(12)
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and

de

5

(1 + p)(ds

c

3

4

(15)

X

+ ds) + B2

Now divide (13) and (14) by (1 + p) and divide (15) by (1 + p)
six equations.

2

and sum the

This gives

(16)
Thus one constraint that the adjustment of consumption levels must
satisfy is that the net present value of the stream of consumption changes,
discounted at the rate P, must he equal to the net present value of the returns
of the project, ,also discounted at the rate p.
the right hand side of (16), as Nx.
p

We shall refer to the latter,

Next, there are four equilibrium conditions

relating to the voluntary donations of individuals 1 throught 4, described
for individual 1 by (3), which must also be satisfied if these individuals
are to have positive savings before and after the project is adopted.

Dif

ferentiating these equations totally and incorporating (1~) we obtain the
system:
1

1/(1 + p)

1

1/(1

+

. 2

p)

1/(1 + p) !
I

J2

0

dc

J3
3

J3

J3

J4
3

J4
4

Jl
3

Jl

J2
1

J2

i3

0

0

0

0

4
4
4

5

J4
5

dc

I

Nx
p

0

Jl
2
2

1

. 2
de

1

Jl

de

3
4

d~S

0

=

0

0

.o

i
i
(1 - ). i3) U4k), k = 1, ... ' 4
- ui - (1 + p)(). i3 UJI<
+
= ik
i
i
C:
),
4, 5.
and for i • 3, 4, Jik - Uik - (1 + p) UiS' k
For i = 1, 2, Jik

(17)
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The solutions to this system are given by
dci • N; Ri, i = 1, •.• , 5.

(18)

Writing J for the square matrix in ( 17), Ri = J11 /

IJI ,

where

cofactor of the element in the first row and ith column of
the determinant of J.

JIi

is the

J and !JI

is

The general equilibrium change in the consumption

i
of individual i due to the project is a constant, R,
multiplied by the net
X
present value of the project discounted at the rate P, N.
. p

that the Ri terms contain,!!£_ project-specifi c data.

Note in particular

The characteristics of

the project enter the determination of the de i, sonly via the NPX terms.

With some

relatively weak restrictions on individual utility functions it is possible
to ensure that each of the Ri terms is strictly positive.
stressed

It must be

that these restrictions are sufficient but not necessary for the

strict positivity of the Ri terms and that none is in any way inconsistent
with the existence of an isolation parar.ox.
First, suppose the utility functions are additively separable.

This

i
together with our assumption of strict concavity, implies Ujk
= 0, j r/: k

i

and Ukk < 0 (assuming c k is an argumen·t of u i , of course).
i

J.
1

<

0 and

guiuantees

We then have

0 except that Jki = 0 when i and k are contempararies.

This

0 for all i, and is perfectly consistent with the existence

(or non-existence) of the isolation paradox, but it is considerably stronger
than we require.

Next, suppose (i) that utility functions are additivelv

separable between the consumption of that individual's contemporary

and

the other arguments of the function and (ii) that for i = 1, 2
(AiJ

u;K

+ (1 - AiJ) ui K) ~ O, k • 3, 4.
4

Assumption (i) means that the utility

1
2
3
4
function of individual 1, for example, can be written U1 (c,
c , c , c)
1 1
3
4
1
= f (c , c , c) + g (c 2 ). This is of course, consistent with the isolation

paradox (imagine the extreme case where dg 1 (c 2 )/de 2

a

0, representing

indifference towards one's contemporary) and ensures again that Jki
where i and k are contemporaries.

c

0,

Assumption (ii) is again consistent

-13with the isolation paradox and with our concavity assumptions and implies
i
that Jk > 0, where k belongs to the generation following i.
i

these assumptions imply R

Together,

> 0 for all i.

Any set of assumptions implying
where i and k are contemporaries and

J~
J!

J!

~

0, and

IJ!I

IJ!I

>

<

0,

>

O, where k belongs to the genera

tion following i, is sufficient to ensure the positivity of the Ri terms.
These assumptions seem "reasonable", and there is no inconsistency between
So

them and our concavity assumptions or with the isolation paradox.
i

grant for the moment that each of the R

terms if positive.

This means

that, from (1~, the sign of the change in the consumption of each indiv9

idual is the same as the sign of Nx.
p

Furthermore, the sign of the change

in the utility of each individual is the same as Nx.
p

For individual 1,

for example,
dU
Since

1

=

4
I:

4
I:
k-= 1

u! ~ 0

(19)

k = 1
1

for all k (no malevolence), M

>

0 and individual 1 benefits or

loses from the project as N~ is positive or negative. 'fhe same applies to the
other four individuals,
(20)

i=l, ... ,5
where Mi> 0 and, as with Ri, Mi contains no project-specific data.

Now consider what is changed if the assumptions required in (6) for the
existence of the isolation paradox are granted.

Suppose the isolation

paradox holds for all individuals in the first two generations.

Still,

the sign of the change in utility of each person due to a project is the
same as that of every other, namely the sign of Nx.
p

Whether the isolation

paradox holds or not, discounting the aggregate returns from the project
in each year at the market rate of discount prov~des an adequate indication
of the welfare effects of the project.

10
i

mutua1ly exc1usive projects, provided R
larger values of de
Nx.
p

i

Clearly, if we have several
X

> 0 larger values of N

p

imply

i
and dU; the projects can be ranked according to

Furthermore, incorporation of income distributional considerations
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into the choice of projects , to the extent that it leads to the ~electio n
of projects with lower values of Nx, is clearly undesira ble from the point
p
of view of each individu al, regardle ss of his initial lump-sum income.
Now return to the issue of the signs of the Ri terms.

Restrict ions on

individu al preferen ces which,. in our view, are "weak", guarante e Ri > O, but
examples not satisfyi ng them and implying the negativ ity of one or more of
the

R

i

terms could presumab ly be construc ted.

What would this mean?

Conside r

the change in utility of individu al 1 resultin g from a project, as given
The negativ ity of one or more of the Ri terms does not necessa rily
1
2
imply the negativ ity of M,
or similarl y of M.
It is easilv shown that
Mi< 0 implies that individu al i is made worse off by, for example,

by (19).

an increase in the lump sum income of each individu al (Yk, where k = 1, .
..• , 5), includin g himself.

his own income alone.

He

is similarl y harmed by an increase in

This possibi lity seems sufficie ntly patholog ical

to be disregar ded, but it is clearly impossi ble for all the Mi terms to
be negativ e.

This would be inconsis tent with the absence of malevole nce

in individu al utility function s.
It should be clear that the possibi lity that a project with
Nx > 0 could gerierate dUi < 0 for some i rests on the nature of in
P

dividua l preferen ces and not on the distribu tional impact of the project.
Suppos~ though, that M1 and M2 hnve opposite signs and that projects are
to be evaluate d from the point of view of the present (initial ) generati on.
Conside r .a Bergson- Samuels on social welfare function W = W (U 1 , u2 ), with
the derivati ves

2

dW = I W dU
i=l i

w1 , w2
i

= Nx

> 0.

Then

2

I W_Hi _

Pi=l

1

Provided V > O, projects can be ranked simply by examing Nx.
p

of the precise form of Wis not required .

Knowledg e

In the bizarre case V < 0

this would still be true, except that the rankings would be inverted , a
possibi lity that hardly seems interest ingJ 1 we conclude that when there

-15-

be ranke d accor ding to
is inter -gen erati onal benev olenc e proje cts can
their net prese nt value at the mark et rate of

disco unt, wheth er the

isola tion parad ox holds or not.
~
Clea rly, the very weak restr ictio ns ensur ing that
2
1
2
= r • If we assum e
and M have the same sign do not imply that r
23
13
3
23
13
are contr ol varia bles
eithe r that A = A = y , or that A and A
the exist ence of an
for indiv idual s 1 and 2, eithe r of which impli es
h
1
. .
r = r 2 requi res tat
isola tion parad ox for both indiv idual s 1 and 2,

u;tu~ = Ui/u;.

to do
This is not impli ed by, in fact has very littl e
2
1
the same sign. Even
with , the weak requi reme nts for M and M to have
·
2
1
2
1
will still typic ally
thoug h M and M have the same sign, r and r
2
1
ct that bene fits in
diffe r. But if sign (M ) = sign (M ) any proje
versa .
divid ual 1 also bene fits indiv idual 2, and vice
that r

1

# r

2

Desp ite the fact

harms one
it is not poss ible to cons truct a proje ct that

isola tion parad ox argum ent
and bene fits the othe r, the impl icatio ns of the
notw ithsta nding .
the impac t of
What unde rlies these resul ts is a "smo othin g" of
ns via the priva te
publi c proje cts both withi n and hetwe en gene ratio
dona tions of indiv idual s.

If one gene ratio n or indiv idual is initi ally

affec ted adve rsely by a proje ct, even thoug h Nxp

>

O, this is comp ensate d

of those indiv idual s to
for by a contr actio n in the volun tary dona tions
r's priva te savin gs equithe next gene ratio n, so as to resto re the dono
libriu m (give n, for indiv idual 1, by (3)).

Indiv idual s affec ted dis

their volun tary dona tions
prop ortio natel y favor ably respo nd by incre asing
red.
until their priva te savin gs equil ibriu m is resto

The first cons train t

prese nt value of the
on these adjus tmen ts is given by (16); the net

-16stream of changes in consumption must sum to the net present value of
12
the project, both discounted at the market rate of discount. These two
aspects of the problem, the "smoothing out" effect implied by the adjust
ments restoring a private savings equilibrium and the constraint on this
process given by the net present value of the project, have not been explicitly incorporated into the analysis in the earlier literature, which
was essentially partial equilibrium in character.

The failure to view the

impact of public projects within a general equilibrium context has led to
a critical error.
A second set of constraints on the above adjustments is given by
the assumption that individuals 1 through 4 have positive consumption and
That is

savings, both before and after the project is introduced.
s i

+ dsi

> 0,

i=l, ••• ,4.

(22)

i a l , ... ,5.

(2 3)

and

.

where dy

i

is a shorthand notation for the change in individual i's income

-due to the project and due to chan~es in his receipts for the previous
generation.

We assume that the project is sufficiently "small" that

positivity constraints (22) and (23) are not violated.

The adjustments of

private voluntary savings re qui red to restore the private savings equilibriur. ,
as induced by the project, are all assumed to be feasible.

If the project

was "large" and the difference between the initial impact of the project on
eachindivid ual and its final general equilibrium impact was also lar~e, some
of the required adjustments could be infeasible.
Finally, we consider the generalizat ion of our results.
extend immediately ton generations .

Our results

So far as the first n-1 generations

are concerned, no restriction s on the numher of individuals involved in
each, or on the way the total net returns to generatioa t, Bt, is
distributed within that generatio~n eed be introduced.

This is seen
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readily be examining equations (11) to (16).

The first n-1 generations

may contain m , m , ••• , mn-l individuals, and the net returns to each
1
2
generation and the savings from the previous generations may each be
distributed in any way (not necessar.ily related).

Summing the mt equations

defining the change in consumption of the members of generation t eliminates
all distributional parameters as before.
each be divided by (1 + p)

t

The resulting equations may then

and summed as before; the conclusions are unaltered.

A difficulty arises when the final generation is allowed to contain
more than one individual and the proportions in which the savings of the
previous generation are distributed among these individuals differ from
the proportions in which the total project returns to the final generation,
B ,

n

are distributed.

For a sufficiently large divergence between the

two, there may be no way that the private donations of the previous
generation can "smooth out'' the equilibrium consumption changes of the
members of the final generation sufficiently to guarantee that they all
have the same sign.

This problem arises only for the final generation

and occurs because that generation necessarily has no savings variable
itself which it can adjust, a problem which is essentially an artifact
of using finite period models.

Nevertheless, to guarantee that all the

dci variables for the members of the fin~l generation have the same sign
it is necessary to introduce a separate redistributional mechanism (for
the final generation alone) or to impose the restriction that the savings
of the previous generation and the returns from the project are distributed
among the nembers of the final generation in the same non-negative proportions.
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IV.

THE "SOCIAL" RATE OF DISCOUNT :Ai.~D THE SHADOW PRICE OF CAPITAL

The existence of an isolation paradox of the type identified by Eckstein,
Sen and Marglin has been used as a rationale for a benefit-cost methodology
differing in two essential ways from the calculation of~ as above.

The

first difference concerns the rate of discount, as we have explained in
Section II.
capital".

The second concerns the introduction of a "shadow price of
This parameter reflects the value of consumption, present and

future, foregone by drawing the necessary capital into the public sector to
set up the project.

In Marglin [1963b] and Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen [1972]

·the calculation of the shadow price of capital is discussed at length.

All

the expressions presented are described as approximations to the appropriate
shadow price, even though most are quite complicated, and we do not
propose to discuss their details here.13All depend, in various ways, on
the private rate of discount, p, and the "social" rate of discount, r,
K

and have the property that for r < p, S

~

1.

What is clear is that

the shadow price of capital is the same for all "small" projects,
assuming they are financed in the same way.
In the previous section we argued that when there is inter-genera
tional benvolence, and whether the isolation paradox holds or not,
projects can be ranked according to their welfare effects by means of
their net present value at the market rate of discount.

At best, any

alternative benefit-cost analysis procedure will give equivalent results.
The question we wish to raise is whether the "social" rate of discount/
shadow price of capital methodology outlined above can in principle give
results equivalent to those obtained with Nx.
p
K

of capital S.

Then the two procedures we

Denote the shadow price
are considering amount to

(assum ing that B0

<

0 and B , B
2
1

+

R / (1
t

~

0)

(24)

P) t

t=o
and

=s¾

2

0

+

r

t=l

B / (1
t

+

r)

t

( 2 S)

·

Table 1
Detai ls of Hypo thetic al Proje cts
Proje ct

B

0

Bl

a

-1

0

4

b

-1

2

0

l --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- i

~-·

Then refer ring to proje cts a and
b
a
.
:N = ~ = 0.
p
b in Table 1 (assum ed "sma ll"), we find using (24) that p
are indif feren t beAs we have shown , it follow s that indiv idual s 1 and 2
Suppo se, for examp le, that p= 1.

To give equiv alent resul ts,

tween accep ting or rejec ting eithe r proje ct.
appli catio n of (25) must give

( 25a)
and
( 25h)
K

For r > -1 these equat ions have the uniqu e solut ion r = 1 and S
K

if -1 < r < 1 in both ( 25a) and ( 25b), then S

l;

canno t have the same value
K

for the two proje cts.

=

For examp le, r = 1/2 imp1ie s value s of S

of 16/9
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and 8 in (25a) and (25b), respectively.

Expression (25) cannot yield

the correct selection criterion when r differs from

p unless either

the shadow price of capital or the "social" rate of discount is "tailor
made" for each of the two projects.
evaluation methodology.

Clearly (21) fails as a decentralized

It cannot properly capture the general equilihriurn

welfare impact of a small project in an economy where the isolation paradox
holds.
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IV.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper has employed a simple general equilibriu m

model of

inter-gen erational benevolen ce to examine the validity of a widely
accepted claim based on the new-famou s ''prisoner 's dilemma" problem.
This claim is that the existence of a special form of inter-gen erational
benevolen ce, known as the isolation paradox case, implies that the rate
of discount used in benefit-c ost analysis should be below the mar~et
(private) rate of discount.

We have found that the argum~nt cannot be

sustained and have attempted to show that the appropria te rate of dis
count is the market rate, whether the isolation paradox exists or not.
Under relatively weak assumptio ns, the existence of inter-gen erational
benevclen ce implies that the calculatio n of the net present value of
a project at the market rate of discount provides an unambiguo us indicator
of the effects of the project on the welfare of each individua l, regardles s
of the distribut ional impact of the project, a much stronger result than
can be shown in the absence of inter-gen erational benevolen ce.

The case

for this benefit-c ost rule is strengthe ned, rather than weakened, hy the
existence of inter-gen erational transfers , even when the isolation paradox
holds.

Alternati ve benefit-c ost procedure s, involving the calculatio n

of a "social rate of discount" and a "shadow price of capital" are infor
mationall y more costly and could at best provide equivalen t iesults; hut
we have attempted to show that such an equivalen ce is not possible in

general.
Finally, we wish to make it clear that the results of this paper
cast no doubt on the analytica l validity, intellect ual interest, or
potential social importanc e of the isolation paradox argument itself,

-22-

or of other, similar forms of the "prison er's dilemma" framewo rk.

What

we have question ed is one particu lar, but importan t, applica tion of this

analysi s:
volent

the claim that, in an economy where private savings for bene

purposes and public (or private) investme nt coexist, projects

should be discount ed at a rate below the market rate of discoun t.

It

remains true that if the isolatio n paradox holds, the equilihr iurn under
private savings is not Pareto optimal ; but discoun ting public (or private)
investm ent at a rate other than the market

rate of discoun t does not

represen t an opportu nity for achievin g a welfare gain.
seldom, if ever, resemble

Public policies

the form of all-embr acing social contrac t en

visaged in the isolatio n paradox argumen t (specify ing that each person
increase his total savings by one unit).

Public policies are superimp osed

on the actions of private. decision -makers , who then adjust, and when these
adjustm ents are taken into account the story changes dramati cally.

Monash Univers ity
and
Yale Univers ity
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FOOTNOTES

1 For example,
see Prest and Turvey [1965] pp. 697-698, Dasgupta, Marglin
and Sen [1972], p. 160, Layard [1972] pp. 37-39, Herfindahl and Kneese
[1974], pp. 206-209, Mishan [1976] pp. 206-207, Boadway [1978] pp. 265266, Boadway [1979] pp. 198-200.
2see Tullock
[1964], Lind [1964], Usher [1964], Lecomber [1977] and
Wellisz [1977).
3As Dasgupta, Marglin and
Sen [1972] point out (pp. 162, 174), many
investment rules that are equivalent in two period models are not
equivalent in models with more than two periods. The generalization of
our results is discussed at the end of Section III.
4

The analogy between savings as treated here and a public good in
the Samuelsonian sense is discussed in Sen [1972] and its externality
character is discussed in Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen [1972], p. 160.

5

It should be clear that it is not simply the existence of inter-generational
benevolence that is the source of the isolation paradox but its presence
combined with the relative absence of intra-generational benevolence.

6

Eckstein [1958] pp. 99-100 presented the essence of this argument,
which later became known as the "isolation paradox," in support
of a discount rate for evalu,ating natural resource projects below
the market rate of interest: "It is not logically inconsistent for
the same person to be willing to borrow at high interest rates to
increase his present consumption while voting to spend tax money to
build a project from which future generations will benefit, for in
the case of a vote to tax, he can be sure that the other individuals
in the society will be compelled to act similarly"

7
Recalling that r 1 and r 2 can differ, it also appears from (10) that
whenever they did differ it would be possible in principle to construct
a project that was beneficial for one and harmful for the other.
We shall return to this issue at the end of Section IV.
8
The ·meaning of "small" will become clear at the end of Section III.
9

Returning to the discussion at the end of Section II it is now clear
that since the dC terms will all have the same sign, the discount
rate applied to tfiem, once they were actually computed, would be
irrelevant. Any discount rate would do.

lOThis conclusion continues to hold if the inequality in (6) is reversed,
implying an isolation paradox of the opposite type from that considered
by Marglin and Sen.
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11

Clearly , V < 0 would imply that W was lowered by an increase in
i
each individ ual's lump sum income, Y.

12

Another way of putting this is that NX measures the net wealth
generate d by the project.
P

13

rhe "shadow price of capital" analysis derives from the recogni tion
that private savings will ordinar ily be affected by the income changes.
resultin g from a project, but confines itself to those resultin g from
the initial establish ment of the project. On the other hand, the
"social" rate of discount analysis discusse d in Section II rests on
the implici t assumpti on that the levels of private savings are un
affected by the income changes resultin g from the adoption of a
project , that all adjustme nt in response to a project takes place
in consump tion alone. This implies that the dC terms in (10) are
t

-

the same as the B~ terms, but it is then not possible for the private
savings equilibr ium conditio ns (2) to hold both before and after the
project is adopted. See Dasgupt a, Marglin and Sen [1972), chapters
13 and 14.

